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Chapter 2 
 
Climate duties, human rights and historic emissions 
 
Derek Bell1 
 
 
The Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) did not produce the hoped for successor to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Instead, ‘Decision 2’ of COP15 ‘takes note of the Copenhagen Accord of 18 
December 2009’ (UNFCCC 2009, p. 4). The Copenhagen Accord is an agreement among 
‘Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of … delegations’ present 
at COP15, but it is not a Protocol to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009, p. 5). Instead, it is a 
voluntary agreement that sets no emissions targets for states but rather asks them to submit to 
the UNFCCC secretariat details of their own planned voluntary emissions reductions or 
mitigation actions. So, while the signatories recognise that ‘climate change is one of the 
greatest challenges of our time’, they have not signed up to mandatory emissions reductions 
(UNFCCC 2009, p. 5). 
 China’s submission to the secretariat states that: 
 
China will endeavor to lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-
45% by 2020 compared to the 2005 level, increase the share of non-fossil fuels in 
primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020 and increase forest coverage by 
40 million hectares and forest stock by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 
2005 levels. (National Development and Reform Commission of China 2010) 
 
These commitments impose no absolute limits on China’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
Moreover, the Chinese submission emphasises that: 
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23 
[T]he above-mentioned autonomous domestic mitigation actions are voluntary in 
nature and will be implemented in accordance with the principles and provisions of 
the UNFCCC, in particular Article 4, paragraph 7. (National Development and 
Reform Commission of China 2010). 
 
The voluntary character of the Chinese mitigation actions is important, but the reference to 
Article 4, paragraph 7 of the UNFCCC may be even more important. This paragraph states 
that: 
 
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their 
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by 
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to 
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that 
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties. (UNFCCC 1992, Article 4, paragraph 7) 
 
The reference to this paragraph suggests that China’s voluntary commitments are 
contingent in two respects. First, they are contingent on funding and technology transfer from 
developed states. If developed states do not provide finance and technology, China should 
not be expected to undertake its voluntary mitigation actions. Second, they are contingent on 
their compatibility with China’s ‘first and overriding priorities’ of ‘economic and social 
development and poverty eradication’. If China must compromise either its economic and 
social development or poverty eradication to undertake successfully its voluntary mitigation 
actions, it should not be expected to undertake those actions. 
 China’s submission to the UNFCCC secretariat reflects the government’s more 
general position on the allocation of the costs of mitigation and adaptation – or, more 
generally, the allocation of ‘climate duties’. China recognises the significance of the threats 
posed by climate change but it insists that the costs associated with climate change should be 
borne primarily by the developed states. The Chinese position, like the position of many 
states in the global South, affirms two important principles. First, the principle of historic 
responsibility – or the polluter pays principle – affirms that the costs associated with climate 
change should be met by the developed states (or the global North) because they are 
historically responsible for most of the greenhouse gas emissions that have causally 
contributed to anthropogenic climate change. The current and future allocation of the costs 
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associated with anthropogenic climate change should be based on each state’s cumulative 
historic emissions. Second, the developing states have a right to development. They should 
not be required to sacrifice development to address the problems associated with climate 
change. Therefore, the costs associated with climate change should be borne only by those 
who can afford to bear those costs – namely, the developed states. 
 In this chapter, I will outline an account of ‘climate justice’ that addresses the 
problem of fairly allocating the costs associated with climate change. In the first section, I 
begin from a particular interpretation of the notion of a right to development. The proposed 
interpretation is based on the ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’ approach suggested by Paul 
Baer and his collaborators. I suggest that Baer’s individualistic interpretation of the right to 
development leads us to a human rights-based approach to climate justice. I outline two 
further rights that follow from the human right to development. In the following sections, I 
consider how an account of climate duties might be developed from these rights-based 
commitments. In section two, I consider Onora O’Neill’s well-known objection to rights-
based theories of justice, namely, that they do not tell us how to allocate the correlative 
duties. I consider a response to this objection and I propose an account of climate duties, 
which distinguishes three kinds of duty that should be included in a full theory of climate 
duties.
2
  
 In the remaining sections of the chapter, I consider these three kinds of duty in more 
detail and in relation to historic emissions. In section three, I consider what I call the ‘general 
climate duty’, namely, the duty to promote effective institutions for the fair specification and 
allocation of particular climate duties. More specifically, I consider when this duty might 
have been first acquired by citizens and states in the global North. In section four, I consider 
principles for specifying and allocating climate duties under just (fair and effective) 
institutions. In particular, I consider the claim that the global North should be held 
responsible for historic emissions because its citizens have exceeded their equal per capita 
share of emission rights. I argue that the principle of equal per capita emissions should be 
rejected. In section five, I outline an account of the duties of rectification that anyone who 
fails (or has failed) to comply with the general climate duty should incur and I suggest that 
this has important implications for how we think about arguments from historic 
responsibility. Section six summarises the arguments of the chapter. 
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The right to development and basic human rights  
The right to development is a controversial idea, which may be interpreted in various ways. 
Paul Baer et al. have suggested a way ‘to make the abstract notion of a right to development 
a reality’ in the context of climate change (Baer et al. 2007, p. 16). They argue that: 
 
In our climate-constrained world, the right to development is not a right to growth, as 
such, in the quest for indefinitely expanding wealth. It is, rather, a right to a particular 
level of development, a modest but dignified level of well-being. We define this level 
by way of a development threshold. Below this threshold, individuals must be allowed 
to prioritize development (Baer et al. 2007, p. 16).  
 
Baer et al. make clear that they understand the right to development as ‘a right of individuals, 
not countries’ (Baer at al. 2009, p. 269; see also Baer et al. 2007, p. 18). In other words, the 
right to development is an individual human right to a ‘modest but dignified level of well-
being’. Baer et al. recognise that any particular claims about the level at which the 
‘development threshold’ should be set, or about what constitutes ‘a modest but dignified level 
of well-being’, are likely to be ‘somewhat arbitrary’ (Baer et al. 2007, p. 17). However, they 
suggest that individuals with an income of less than $7500 (purchasing power parity 
adjusted) have the right to prioritise their own development over other issues (Baer et al. 
2009, p. 269). In other words, they suggest that a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’ 
may not be available to individuals with an income below this level but will normally be 
available to individuals with an income above this level.  
 Baer’s individualistic understanding of the right to development may not be in 
keeping with more common statist conceptions of the right to development. However, it 
seems difficult to resist the claim that we care about development because we care that 
individuals are able to achieve a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’. If it is plausible 
to understand the right to development as an individual human right to a ‘modest but 
dignified level of well-being’, we might usefully consider the implications of this right for a 
theory of climate justice.  
 I want to suggest that there are two important climate-related rights that follow from 
this understanding of the right to development. First, the right to a ‘modest but dignified level 
of well-being’ implies a right to the necessary means to achieve that level of well-being. For 
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example, if burning fossil fuels is the only available means for a person to keep warm or to 
meet other important ‘needs’ (which are constitutive of a ‘modest but dignified level of well-
being’), the right to development implies that they have a right to burn fossil fuels. In other 
words, the right to development implies that individuals below the development threshold 
should not be required to limit their greenhouse gas emissions unless they have alternative 
means readily available to them that would allow them to achieve a ‘modest but dignified 
level of well-being’ without burning fossil fuels. As Baer et al. suggest, the right to 
development implies that those below the development threshold ‘should be exempt from any 
requirement to pay for climate policy’ (Baer et al. 2009, p. 269). 
 Second, the right to a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’ implies a right not to 
be reduced below a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’ by the adverse effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. The fourth IPCC report states that: 
 
The health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for 
example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due to 
extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; … and the altered 
spatial distribution of some infectious diseases. (IPCC 2007, p. 48) 
 
We can expect that climate change will cause many people to die from malnutrition, extreme 
weather events (including flooding, heat waves, wildfires and hurricanes), diarrhoeal 
diseases, infectious diseases and lack of water. We can expect that the well-being of billions 
of other people will be affected very adversely by climate change. Human emissions of 
greenhouse gases will make (and already have made) a significant causal contribution to 
many people remaining or being brought below the development threshold throughout the 
world (IPCC 2007, p. 33), and particularly in some areas of the global South. In short, 
anthropogenic climate change might now be considered to be a ‘standard threat’, against 
which individuals should be protected, to the right to a ‘modest but dignified level of well-
being’ (Shue 1980, p. 13).3  
 So far, I have outlined a human rights interpretation of one of the two key principles 
advocated by China and other developing states, namely, the right to development. Building 
on the work of Paul Baer and his colleagues, I have suggested that the human right to a 
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‘modest but dignified level of well-being’ implies two further climate-related rights. First, the 
right of those below the development threshold to be ‘exempt from any requirement to pay 
for climate policy’. Second, the right not be held or forced below the development threshold 
as a consequence of the adverse effects of anthropogenic climate change. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I propose to explore the implications of this rights-based approach for a theory 
of climate justice. In particular, I will consider how we might develop an account of climate 
duties that are correlative to the second derivative right that we have identified (i.e., the right 
not to be held or forced below the development threshold as a consequence of the adverse 
effects of anthropogenic climate change) while also respecting the first derivative right (i.e., 
the right of those below the development threshold to be ‘exempt from any requirement to 
pay for climate policy’). In other words, my aim is to develop an account of climate duties 
that begins to tell us who is required to do what to prevent the harms associated with climate 
change. This account will help us to judge China’s responsibility, or lack of it, for climate 
change. I will pay particular attention to the place of the principle of historic responsibility – 
the other key principle advocated by China and other developing states – in a theory of 
climate duties. Does a theory of climate justice grounded in the right to development support 
the Chinese claim that the costs associated with climate change should be borne primarily by 
the global North because the global North is historically responsible for climate change? 
 
The general duty and particular duties 
Onora O’Neill has argued that the problem with rights-based theories is that they do not tell 
us who has the duty to protect rights (see, for example, O’Neill 1986, pp. 101-3; 1996, pp. 
129-35). O’Neill’s particular target is positive rights, such as rights to welfare or education, 
because she assumes that we can specify the duties that are correlative to negative rights, 
such as the right not to be killed or injured. However, O’Neill’s concern about unspecified 
duties extends to negative rights when those rights can be violated by the cumulative actions 
and collective practices – working through complex causal chains – of many millions of 
people.
4
 In the context of anthropogenic climate change, a human rights-based theory does 
not seem to tell us what we most need to know: Who has a duty to do what? When do a 
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2005, p. 53).  
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person’s greenhouse gas emissions, or other actions, violate the human right to development 
of victims of anthropogenic climate change? 
 In reply to O’Neill’s concerns, Elizabeth Ashford has suggested that we can identify a 
duty that is correlative to human rights – namely, the duty to promote and maintain effective 
institutions that will fairly ‘specify and allocate’ the particular duties needed to ensure the 
protection of human rights (Ashford 2007, p. 217). If we take human rights seriously and we 
do not have clear and widely acknowledged criteria for specifying and allocating correlative 
duties, then we should recognise a duty to promote and maintain effective institutions that 
will fairly specify and allocate the duties needed to ensure the protection of human rights. Let 
us call this the ‘general duty’. In the context of climate change, we might recognise a ‘general 
climate duty’ – namely, the duty to promote and maintain effective institutions that will fairly 
specify and allocate the particular duties needed to ensure the protection of the human right 
to development from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. The general climate 
duty is implicit in the broader general duty once we recognise climate change as a ‘standard 
threat’ to the human right to development (Shue 1980, p. 13).5 
 The main problem with both the general duty and the general climate duty is that they 
still do not specify or allocate particular duties to individuals. Instead, they attempt to defer 
the problem by requiring us to promote institutions that will solve the problem for us by 
fairly specifying and allocating particular duties to individuals. However, the problem cannot 
be so easily deferred for two reasons. First, the duty to promote institutions that will fairly 
specify and allocate particular duties to individuals might plausibly be re-described as a duty 
to promote just institutions. However, I can only fulfil my duty to promote just institutions by 
promoting a particular substantive conception of justice. However, a particular substantive 
conception of justice will be (or will entail) an account of how particular rights and duties 
should be specified and allocated to individuals. In other words, we can only fulfil our duty to 
promote substantively just institutions if we already have an account of how particular duties 
should be specified and allocated to individuals. The general climate duty cannot be fulfilled 
unless we have a prior account of (or principles for) the fair specification and allocation of 
particular duties. 
 The second problem with the general climate duty is that it produces an additional 
problem of specification and allocation – namely, the problem of specifying and allocating 
the general climate duty itself. If the promotion of fair and effective (or just) institutions is a 
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29 
collective endeavour, we will need to work out what the duty to promote just institutions 
requires from particular individuals at particular times and places. It is, for example, plausible 
that the general duty requires different actions from President Obama than it does from the 
average US citizen. Similarly, it might require different actions from the average UK citizen 
than it does from a person living on less than $1 per day in a developing nation. In other 
words, a full account of the general climate duty will include an account of the fair 
specification and allocation of the duty to promote just institutions.  
 These important concerns about the general climate duty might lead us to the 
conclusion that we should look for an alternative response to O’Neill’s criticism of rights-
based theories. However, I think that would be premature. We have seen that the general 
climate duty cannot offer a complete solution to the problem of identifying the duties that are 
correlative to basic human rights. However, it does offer us a useful way of approaching the 
problem. The general climate duty suggests a particular structure for an account of each 
person’s particular duties. It points us toward two sets of particular duties that a theory of 
human rights-based duties will need to specify and allocate. First, we need principles for the 
allocation of the duty to promote just institutions. These principles will tell us how to 
determine who should do what to promote just institutions. Second, we need principles for 
the specification and allocation of particular duties (to protect the human right to 
development from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change) under fair and effective 
institutions. These principles will tell us who should do what when we have just institutions 
to protect the human right to development.  
 In addition, a theory of human rights-based duties may need to specify duties of 
rectification if our duty to promote just institutions is not fulfilled.
6
 So, the third part of an 
account of human rights-based duties should include principles for the specification and 
allocation of duties that arise from the failure of some people to comply with their particular 
duties to promote just institutions. For example, if the failure of some of us to comply with 
our duty to promote just institutions prevents or delays the development and implementation 
of just institutions, we need to work out how (if at all) this affects the future duties of both the 
compliers and the non-compliers.  
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 We might also need principles to specify and allocate duties when some people do not comply with just (or 
fair and effective) institutions. However, for institutions to qualify as ‘effective’, and therefore as ‘just’, they 
must prevent large-scale non-compliance. I will not address the problem of non-compliance under just 
institutions in this chapter. Instead, I make the simplifying assumption that we can make fair institutions 
effective by designing appropriate penalties and punishments for non-compliance. 
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 In the next three sections, I will consider how we might begin to develop these three 
parts of an account of human rights-based duties in the particular context of climate change. 
More specifically, I will consider the role and relevance of historic emissions in the proposed 
account of climate duties. In section 3, I consider when we might first have acquired the 
general climate duty. I relate this discussion to the claim that the global North should pay the 
costs of anthropogenic climate change because it is morally culpable for its historic 
emissions, as argued by Chinese diplomats. In section 4, I consider one account of how 
climate duties should be allocated under just institutions. I argue that we should reject the 
idea of a universal right to equal emissions (or ‘equal emissions over time’) and, therefore, I 
suggest that all historic emissions should not be counted equally. In section 5, I consider 
duties of rectification. I outline some important duties of rectification and I suggest that it is 
the recent historic emissions of the global North that are likely to generate the most 
significant duties. 
 
The duty to promote fair and effective institutions 
The general duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection of human rights 
is a duty that has existed for as long as human rights have existed. However, the general 
climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection of the human right to 
development from the threat posed by climate change may be better understood as a newer 
duty. The human right to development, which is threatened by climate change, is not a new 
human right that has only come into existence with this environmental problem. It is a human 
right that can be violated in many different ways. Anthropogenic climate change is a new 
threat to – or a new way of violating – that right. Therefore, the original formulation of 
human rights, or the human right to development, could not plausibly have identified climate-
related duties. This is a case where changes in ‘circumstances which were not predicted … 
give rise to a new duty which was not predicted in advance’ (Raz 1986, p. 185). The duties 
that are correlative to human rights, including the right to development, will change over time 
because the ‘typical major threats’ will change over time (Shue 1980, p. 33). Anthropogenic 
climate change is a new way of violating human rights, which gives rise to new duties, 
including a new general climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the 
protection of the human right to development from the new threat posed by anthropogenic 
climate change. This is a normal result of the ‘dynamic character’ of human rights (Raz 
1986, p. 185). 
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  The general climate duty is a relatively new duty, but when did it come into 
existence? I want to suggest that two conditions are relevant to determining when the general 
climate duty came into existence. I want to suggest that two factors are important here. First, 
we have seen that the general climate duty is a response to the new ‘standard threat’ posed by 
climate change to the human right to development. Therefore, the general climate duty 
cannot have come into existence before climate change posed a ‘standard threat’ to that right. 
Two points of clarification are in order here. First, we should distinguish between the time at 
which climate change became a ‘standard threat’ to the human right to development and the 
time at which humans could reasonably have recognised climate change as a ‘standard threat’ 
to the human right to development. It is, at least, possible that climate change posed a serious 
threat to human rights before humans knew or could reasonably have been expected to know 
about it. Second, any judgement about when climate change became a ‘standard threat’ to 
human rights is likely to be contestable. It is clear from the evidence that climate change 
should now be recognised as a ‘standard threat’ to the human right to development. We know 
that the effects of climate change have already violated the human rights of some people and 
are likely to violate the human rights of many millions of people in the near (and far) future. 
It is less clear when anthropogenic climate change first posed a ‘standard threat’ to the 
human right to development.  
When did climate change first pose a ‘standard threat’?  Was it at the very beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution when humans developed the capacity to emit large quantities of 
greenhouse gases?  Was it early in the twentieth century when the mass production of motor 
vehicles began? Was it shortly after the Second World War when the global population 
exceeded 2.5 billion? Perhaps, the most plausible way of approaching this question is to 
consider when the probability of climate change causing widespread violations of the human 
right to development (and, thereby, posing a ‘standard threat’) exceeded some threshold. So, 
for example, we might imagine that the probability in the 1750s that humanity would take the 
route that it has taken since the Industrial Revolution (e.g., the technological change, the 
population increases, and the social and economic changes) may have been quite low so that 
the likelihood of anthropogenic climate change violating human rights might also have been 
quite low. We might, therefore, conclude that climate change did not pose a ‘standard threat’ 
to human rights until more recently. A more detailed empirical argument would be required 
to make a plausible case for any particular date. However, we might reasonably conclude that 
some of the more ambitious claims about the historic responsibility of the global North might 
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not be consistent with this understanding of when an agent’s greenhouse gas emissions can 
legitimately be understood as rights-violating. 
 I have suggested that the first condition on the existence of the general climate duty is 
that it cannot have come into existence until anthropogenic climate change posed a ‘standard 
threat’ to human rights. The second condition is that the general climate duty – like all duties 
– should not be unreasonably demanding. We might distinguish two ways in which the 
general climate duty might be too demanding. First, the general climate duty might be too 
demanding because it might ask people to sacrifice too much. The general climate duty asks 
us to make two kinds of sacrifice. First, it asks us to pay the opportunity costs of devoting 
time to promoting just institutions. In some circumstances, this might be too much to ask of 
an agent. For example, a person living below the development threshold is likely to have 
more urgent demands on their time, energy and resources; therefore they should not be 
required to devote their limited time, energy and resources to promoting institutions that 
secure climate justice.  Second, the general climate duty asks us to pay the opportunity costs 
of living under and complying with just institutions (after they have been successfully 
promoted and implemented). If institutions are genuinely just, they should not ask too much 
of individuals. On our account, just institutions will exempt those below the development 
threshold from paying the costs of climate policy. I think we might reasonably argue that 
neither the duty to promote just institutions nor the duty to comply with just institutions, 
properly interpreted, should demand too much from most citizens in the global North. 
Moreover, neither duty should demand anything from any person – in the global South or the 
global North – who is living below the development threshold. 
The second way in which the general climate duty might be too demanding is that it 
might require us to promote fair and effective institutions for tackling climate change before 
we could reasonably be expected to know about the problem and its effects. If at time t we 
are excusably ignorant of the effects of our use of fossil fuels, it seems unreasonable either: at 
t, to claim that we have the general climate duty; or at t+1, to claim that we should be held 
morally responsible for our ‘non-compliance’ at t with the general climate duty. So, the 
general climate duty can only be imputed to an agent that is either knowledgeable or 
inexcusably ignorant about the link between fossil fuel use and the rights-violating effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. Judgements about excusable ignorance will, of course, be 
contestable. However, I think we might reasonably argue that most ordinary citizens in the 
global North were excusably ignorant of the effects of fossil fuel use until (at least) the mid-
1980s.  
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In this section, I have discussed the general climate duty.
7
 I have considered how we 
might determine when the general climate duty should be understood to have come into 
existence. I have argued that the general climate duty could not have come into existence 
until the probability of anthropogenic climate change violating the human right to 
development became significant. I have also suggested that the general climate duty should 
only be imputed to an agent when (a) that agent has knowledge of, or is inexcusably ignorant 
of, the link between fossil fuel use and rights-violating anthropogenic climate change, and (b) 
complying with the general climate duty (and complying with the proposed just institutions) 
does not make unreasonable demands on the agent.  
 This understanding of the ‘birth’ of the general climate duty is significant because it 
poses an important obstacle to historic responsibility arguments, including those made by 
Chinese officials. On one understanding of the historic responsibility argument, Northern 
states and their citizens should pay the costs of tackling anthropogenic climate change 
because they are morally responsible for the problem. However, my proposed theory of 
human rights and duties suggests that only the current generation of ordinary citizens in 
Northern states might be considered guilty of any climate-related moral failure. The general 
climate duty cannot reasonably be imputed to ordinary citizens before the mid-1980s. 
Therefore, the most ambitious arguments by Chinese officials and others for historic 
responsibility – grounded in moral responsibility or moral failure and extending back to the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution – should be rejected.8 
  
The specification and allocation of particular duties under fair and effective institutions 
How should fair and effective institutions specify and allocate particular duties to protect the 
human right to development from the threat posed by climate change? What principles for the 
specification and allocation of climate duties should people who comply with the general 
climate duty be trying to promote? In particular, I want to consider the possibility that fair 
principles will allocate climate duties based on historic emissions. We have already seen that 
there are good reasons for thinking that the North’s moral failure with respect to climate 
change is relatively recent. Therefore, if we want to allocate climate duties based on historic 
                                                 
7
 Jonathan Symons argument in Chapter 5 offers one way of interpreting the implications of the general climate 
duty for states, including China. 
8
 Shue has argued that the excusable ignorance objection ‘rests upon a confusion between punishment and 
responsibility’ (Shue 1999, p. 535). Shue’s point is that developed states might be liable for the costs associated 
with their historic emissions without being morally culpable for those emissions. I have discussed Shue’s 
argument and the problem of excusable ignorance in more detail in Bell (2011b).  See also Chapter 4 in this 
volume. 
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emissions over a longer period of history, we will need a different kind of argument to 
support that claim. In this section, I will consider one important argument that has been 
offered to support the claim that the allocation of particular climate duties should be 
proportionate to historic emissions. 
 The central claim of this argument is that there is a universal right to equal 
greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of the time and place that a person lives. We might call 
this ‘equal emissions’. Let us assume that we are seeking to promote fair and effective 
institutions for the specification and allocation of climate duties from time t onwards. If we 
accept equal emissions, we will take into account the historic emissions of each person before 
time t in allocating their current and future emissions to ensure that over their lifetime they do 
not exceed their ‘equal emissions’ allowance. Moreover, if we find that some persons have 
already emitted more than their ‘equal emissions’ allowance, we may reasonably require 
them to compensate others (assuming that there is some commensurability between 
emissions permits and other ‘goods’) by, for example, paying for adaptation. 
 There are several problems with ‘equal emissions’.9 I want to highlight two important 
problems. First, it is not at all clear why there should be a universal right to equal emissions. 
We do not normally distribute particular resources – even newly discovered resources – in an 
egalitarian manner (Beckerman and Pasek 1995). Indeed, there are very few resources that 
are distributed equally in the contemporary world. Of course, we need not endorse the 
distributive principles that appear to operate in, or between, contemporary societies (even so-
called ‘liberal democratic’ societies). Instead, we might, and probably should, adopt a more 
egalitarian theory of global justice.  
 However, the second problem with equal emissions is that there are good reasons for 
advocates of egalitarian theories of global justice to support an unequal distribution of 
emissions. I will suggest two reasons. First, different persons may need different resources to 
achieve the same levels of development or well-being. Emission permits are a resource just 
like the fossil fuels that produce emissions. Some persons may need to use more energy (and 
emit more greenhouse gases) than other persons to achieve the same level of development. If 
we are concerned about everyone achieving a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’, we 
may reasonably reject equal emissions. Second, circumstances may vary between different 
times and places such that the marginal opportunity costs of not emitting greenhouse gases 
vary considerably. This variation may be due to a range of factors, including, the availability 
                                                 
9
 I have discussed some of these problems in Bell (2008). 
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and cost of non-fossil fuel energy and the energy required to achieve a ‘modest but dignified 
level of well-being’ given the social, economic and technological structure of one’s society. 
For example, it may be reasonable to suggest that current generations in the global North 
should not be entitled to emit such large quantities of greenhouse gases as previous 
generations because we have non-fossil fuel energy technology available to us, which would 
enable us to maintain a ‘modest but dignified level of well-being’ without burning such large 
quantities of fossil fuels. Therefore, we might reasonably reject ‘equal emissions’ between 
contemporary citizens in the global North and both previous generations in the global North 
and current generations in the global South. 
 If we reject ‘equal emissions’, we cannot treat all emissions at all times and places 
equally. Therefore, we will need to be rather more careful about how we take historic 
emissions into account in determining current and future responsibilities. In particular, one 
unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twenty-first century should 
not count equally with one unit of emissions from the global South at the same time or with 
one unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
marginal opportunity cost – measured in an appropriate metric, such as impact on well-being 
– of reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be considered when we try to determine a fair 
allocation of climate duties. In other words, historic emissions may be relevant in 
determining the fair allocation of climate duties under just institutions but historic 
‘subsistence emissions’, which could only have been limited at a high opportunity cost, 
should not be treated in the same way as historic ‘luxury emissions’, which might have been 
limited at a low opportunity cost (Shue 1993).  
 
Duties of rectification 
So far, I have discussed the general climate duty to promote just institutions and the 
specification and allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In this section, I will 
briefly discuss duties of rectification. The general climate duty assumes that the specification 
and allocation of more specific duties must be done by effective institutions that aim to 
protect human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change. This suggests that we 
have no specific duties – for example, to limit our individual greenhouse gas emissions – 
until there is ‘an actual [and “authoritative”] allocative scheme, operative and in force’ 
(Feinberg 1984, p. 30). This is morally problematic because it suggests that we can continue 
with ‘business-as-usual’ greenhouse gas emissions until there are fair and effective 
institutional regulations in place that specify the level at which we are required to limit our 
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emissions. This creates a perverse incentive for continuing non-compliance with the general 
climate duty: if we don’t comply with the general climate duty and just institutions are not 
created, we do not violate any human rights-based duties by continuing to emit high levels of 
greenhouse gases.
10
 If we want to avoid this problem, we need to go beyond the general 
climate duty. 
 I want to suggest two further duties, which follow from the general climate duty. 
First, we have a duty to rectify the wrong that we have done if we fail to comply with the 
general climate duty. On our account, if a person does not comply with the general climate 
duty, he violates the correlative human rights. We generally recognise that if a person 
violates another person’s human rights, they have a duty to rectify the wrong that they have 
done.
11
 What does rectification require in the context of the general climate duty? Let us 
assume that rectification cannot take place until just institutions are in place and duties are 
specified and allocated. I would suggest that rectification requires that those who have not 
complied with the general climate duty should be allocated more burdensome duties, 
including, for example, lower limits on their future greenhouse gas emissions and a greater 
share of the monetary costs of adaptation measures. The minimum requirement should be that 
they are not advantaged over the course of their lifetime by their failure to comply with the 
general climate duty. Moreover, non-compliers might legitimately be required to accept a 
worse outcome if rectification (or compensation) of the situation of the victims of climate-
related human rights violations requires it. In sum, the general climate duty implies a duty of 
rectification: under effective institutions, previous non-compliers must accept more 
burdensome duties that may make them worse off than they would have been if they had 
always complied with the general climate duty. 
 The second duty that follows from the general climate duty is the duty not to accept 
benefits that result from actions that violate someone’s human rights. If there were full 
compliance with the general climate duty, we might plausibly assume that effective 
institutions, for specifying and allocating duties to protect the human right to development 
from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change would quickly be implemented. Let 
us assume that some people comply with the general climate duty but others do not and as a 
result just institutions are not implemented. Some of the compliers may benefit from the 
delayed implementation of just institutions if, for example, they have been enjoying a 
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 We are, of course, violating human rights by not complying with the general duty to promote just institutions. 
However, the argument so far does not imply that we would be violating human rights by continuing to emit 
high levels of greenhouse gases. 
11
 There may also be reason to punish them for the wrong that they have done. 
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lifestyle dependent upon a higher level of emissions than they would have been permitted 
under just institutions. We might reasonably say that they are benefiting from the actions of 
the non-compliers. In other words, they are benefiting from actions that violate human rights. 
It is, however, surely wrong for someone who takes human rights seriously to accept benefits 
that result from human rights violations. Therefore, I would suggest that the general climate 
duty also implies a duty not to accept benefits that result from the failure of other people to 
comply with the general duty. 
 What does this additional duty require? I would suggest that it requires each person 
(1) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a level that they can reasonably believe would 
be consistent with the specification and allocation of duties by just institutions, and (2) to 
accept that just institutions can legitimately take into account the historic emissions (and 
other relevant actions) of those who have complied with the general climate duty (as well as 
those who have not complied) during the period that just institutions were delayed by non-
compliance. In other words, the duty not to accept benefits requires both individual action 
now, even in advance of just institutions and compliance with institutions that (fairly and 
effectively) specify and allocate duties ‘retrospectively’.  
 If this account of duties of rectification is plausible, the failure of Northern states and 
Northern citizens to comply with the general climate duty over (at least) the last twenty or 
thirty years has significant implications for their duties now and in the future. The North is 
guilty of a moral failure in recent times and should seek to rectify that failure. Northern 
citizens are not only required to comply with the general climate duty (i.e., ‘do their bit’ to 
promote just institutions) but are also required to limit their own current and future emissions 
to a level that they can reasonably believe would be consistent with the specification and 
allocation of duties by just institutions. Moreover, Northern citizens should be seeking to 
promote just institutions that will demand a lot from them, including, compensation for the 
excessive (unjust) emissions that they have emitted since they acquired the duty to promote 
just climate institutions in the late twentieth century.  
 
Conclusion 
We began with two key principles that underpin the Chinese position on the allocation of the 
costs of climate change. In section 1, I offered an individualistic interpretation of the right to 
development as a human right. In the remainder of the chapter, I considered the implications 
of this starting point for an account of climate duties and, in particular, the principle of 
historic responsibility. I have outlined three kinds of climate duty. First, we have a general 
38 
climate duty to promote just institutions that will protect the human right to development 
from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. I have suggested that a reasonable 
account of this duty undermines one important argument – the argument from ‘moral failure’ 
– for taking all historic emissions into account when we allocate climate duties. We cannot 
justifiably claim, as the Chinese government has done, that Northern citizens or Northern 
states should be held morally responsible for their historic emissions prior to the time when 
they can reasonably be said to have acquired the general climate duty. However, they can be 
held morally responsible for their failure to comply with that duty since they acquired it. If 
we assume that Northern citizens only acquired the general climate duty sometime in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, we should regard their pre-1980s emissions very 
differently from their emissions since that time.  
 Second, we have a duty to comply with effective institutions that fairly specify and 
allocate duties to protect the human right to development from the threat posed by climate 
change. I suggested that one common argument for taking historic emissions into account 
when allocating climate duties was based on the idea of a universal right to equal emissions. I 
offered two criticisms of this argument. First, it is unclear why we should be egalitarians 
about greenhouse gas emissions permits when we are not generally egalitarians about other 
resources. Second, I suggested that egalitarianism about emissions ignores the difference 
between luxury and subsistence emissions and, more generally, does not take into account the 
variation between the marginal costs of emissions reductions for different people in different 
places and at different times. Therefore, I have suggested that a fair allocation of emissions 
(or emission permits) is not likely to be an equal allocation. Instead, I have suggested that 
current citizens of the global North might be entitled to emit less than their predecessors. As 
a result, it may be that previous generations in the North have not exceeded their fair share of 
emissions by as much as some have suggested. However, current generations in the global 
North may be exceeding their fair share of emissions by even more than the principle of 
equal emissions suggests. 
 The third kind of climate duty that we have identified is duties of rectification. I have 
suggested that most Northern citizens do have duties to rectify their failure to comply with 
the general climate duty (since they acquired it in the late twentieth century). These duties 
include a duty to reduce their own emissions immediately to a level that they can reasonably 
believe is consistent with the allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In addition, 
Northern citizens should – to comply with the general climate duty and the duties of 
rectification – be seeking to promote a global climate regime and effective institutions that 
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will make severe demands on them. In particular, most Northern citizens should expect to be 
required under just institutions to pay compensation for their unjust post-1980s emissions. 
 Climate change poses a very serious threat to human rights, including the human right 
to development, in the twenty-first century and beyond. We have a duty to protect the human 
right to development from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. In this chapter, 
I have offered the outline of a distinctive account of how we should understand our climate 
duties. In particular, I have explored the relevance and the role of historic emissions in the 
allocation of climate duties. The Chinese Government, like many in the global South, has 
argued consistently that the global North should be held responsible for the costs of climate 
change because it is their historic emissions that have caused the problem. I have suggested 
that this claim should not be accepted without further consideration and refinement. 
Specifically, I have suggested that the citizens of the global North do have a duty to pay 
compensation for their excessive (unjust) emissions during the last twenty or thirty years.
12
 
However, I have also suggested that earlier emissions should not be treated in the same way. 
Earlier emissions may be relevant for the allocation of climate duties under just institutions, 
but they are not relevant in the straightforward way that often seems to be assumed by 
Chinese officials or in general debates about climate justice.  
                                                 
12
 Chapters 9 and 10 argue that affluent people in China may have similar obligations. 
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